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Introduction
The idea of pretext came into the ambit of the judiciary early in
American history. In McCulloch v. Maryland,1 Chief Justice Marshall
famously warned against the danger of “Congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass[ing] laws for the accomplishment of objects

1.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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not entrusted to the government.”2 Today, courts continue to grapple
with how to confront pretextual explanations for decisions at issue in
litigation. Courts have developed doctrines that guide inquiries into
pretext in some contexts, specifically in the context of employmentdiscrimination3 and discriminatory peremptory-challenge claims.4 And
some laws prescribe inquiries into pretext, such as fraud and moneylaundering statutes.5 However, outside of these discreet categories of
claims, courts face confusion about when to inquire into pretext and
what pretext even looks like. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Department of Commerce v. New York6 brought the question of pretext
into administrative law, throwing a wrench in an arena normally
characterized by deferential, low standards of review.7
This Comment examines the different forms and functions of
pretext across several areas of law and analyzes whether those
differences make sense. Evidence of pretext in Title VII and Batson
claims may look similar: proof of disparate treatment, statistics, and
anecdotes all serve to establish pretext in these areas;8 while a paper
trail of the decision-making process supports a finding of pretext in the
administrative context. 9 The purpose of pretext inquiries in each of
these areas differs too—while Title VII claims and Batson claims seek
to uncover illegal discrimination,10 administrative pretext claims serve
as a method of political accountability.11 Beyond the different purposes
of pretext across these areas of law, pretext is also subject to varying
standards of proof, affecting the extent to which pretext is
determinative of the outcome of a case.12

2.

Id. at 423.

3.

Throughout this Comment, I will use the labels “employment discrimination”
and “Title VII” interchangeably to refer to causes of action arising under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e and to employment-discrimination claims arising under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1311.

4.

Throughout this Comment, I will use the labels “discriminatory
peremptory challenge claims” and “Batson claims” interchangeably to
refer to claims arising under the framework set out in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).

5.

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

6.

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).

7.

See id. at 2574–75, 2577–78.

8.

See, e.g., Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).

9.

Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575–76.

10.

See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).

11.

Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2573.

12.

See infra notes 154–72 and accompanying text.
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While some of these differences comport with the purpose of pretext
inquiries in each area, others could be updated to better reflect the
purpose that inquiring into pretext serves. Part I of this Comment
examines when courts inquire into pretext. Part II discusses what a
finding of pretext looks like in Title VII, Batson, and administrative
law cases. Part III analyzes the purpose of pretext inquiries in each of
these areas and evaluates whether the differences in how pretext is
treated are merited given its purpose in each area of law.

I.

When Do Courts Inquire into Pretext?

Courts consistently inquire into pretext in two instances: (1) when
a statute mandates that the court look into pretext behind a decision
or law, and (2) when a statute makes no such mandate, but the
circumstances create a situation where a decision-maker is able to
“cover up” a discriminatory action by asserting a neutral justification.
A.

Mandated by Statute

Prominent examples of statutes which demand pretext inquiries are
found in the fraud context. This is because pretext is essentially an
element of the crime. For example, under the federal wire-fraud
statute,13 the prosecution must prove that the defendant transmitted
communications through interstate commerce “having devised or
intend[ed] to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”14
In practice, a common application of the statute is to uncover illegal
weapons purchases.15 Another common application is in the tax-fraud
context.16 A less common application of the statute is to ferret out
political pretenses for decisions of elected officials. For example, the
Third Circuit affirmed the conviction of aides of the former governor of
New Jersey under the wire-fraud statute after the aides caused lane
closures on the George Washington Bridge, producing days of traffic
gridlock in Fort Lee, New Jersey. The aides’ stated reason for doing so,
a traffic study, was pretext for punishing Fort Lee’s mayor who was

13.

18 U.S.C. § 1343.

14.

Id. (emphasis added).

15.

See, e.g., United States v. Kelerchian, 937 F.3d 895, 901–02, 906–07 (7th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2825 (2020) (affirming conviction for
conspiracy to commit fraud where defendants planned to purchase machineguns from a gun importer under the pretense that the weapons were intended
for the county sheriff’s department).

16.

See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 911–12, 921 (2d Cir. 1957)
(affirming tax fraud conviction for concealing profits of defendants’ whiskey
business).
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not supporting the governor’s reelection bid.17 Where pretext is a key
part of the crime, as in this example, statutory interpretation will guide
the pretext inquiry.
B.

Not Mandated by Statute

Where a statute does not mandate an inquiry into pretext, courts
have established doctrines that require pretext inquiries in certain
contexts. Employment-discrimination claims and discriminatoryperemptory-challenge claims provide traditional examples. 18 Another
example, albeit untraditional, is in administrative law.19
1.

Employment Discrimination

Employment-discrimination claims, brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 20 are evaluated using a burden-shifting framework
established by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.21 Under
the framework,22 the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case,
which requires demonstrating that (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she “engaged in protected activity,” such as applying for the
job; (3) her employer “took adverse action against [her]”; and (4) “a
causal relationship existed between the protected activity and the
adverse employment activity.”23 After the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to put forth
a nondiscriminatory reason for the action.24 The plaintiff must then

17.

United States v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 555, 564 (3d Cir. 2018), rev’d sub
nom. Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1568–69 (2020) (reversing
and remanding on the grounds that the object of the fraud conviction was
not “property” within the definition of the statute and therefore was
insufficient to support a property wire-fraud conviction).

18.

See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).

19.

See, e.g., Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574–75 (2019).

20.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Employment-discrimination claims may also be
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 2 U.S.C. § 1311.

21.

411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).

22.

This framework is applicable when the plaintiff seeks to establish an
employment-discrimination case using circumstantial evidence. Where
there is direct evidence on the matter, the test “is whether retaliation was
a substantial or motivating factor in the decision making process.” Farrar
v. Stratford, 537 F. Supp. 2d 332, 354 (D. Conn. 2008) (quoting Talada
v. Int’l Serv. Sys., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 936, 955 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).

23.

Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir.
2015); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; see also Foster, 787
F.3d at 253.

24.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
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demonstrate that the employer’s reason was pretext for discrimination.25 At all times the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion.26 A
finding that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse action was
pretextual does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will prevail
because, as part of her burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must also
prove that the actual reason for the action was discriminatory.27
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework was originally
applied to claims alleging discriminatory failure to hire under Title
VII.28 However, since the framework’s inception, courts have applied it
to uncover pretextual motives in other discrimination claims under
Title VII, including retaliation, 29 termination, 30 and failure to
promote.31 The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework has also
been applied to discrimination claims under other federal laws which
prohibit employment discrimination, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act32 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.33
2.

Batson Claims

Discriminatory-peremptory-challenge claims brought pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment, are also evaluated using a framework to
uncover pretextual motives. As established by the Court in Batson v.
Kentucky, 34 to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant must show that (1) “he is a member of a cognizable
[protected] group,” (2) “the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
25.

Id. at 804.

26.

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

27.

Id. at 524 (“That the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even
obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff’s
proffered reason of race is correct. That remains a question for the factfinder to answer . . . .”).

28.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.

29.

See, e.g., Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015).

30.

See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506, 508, 542 (1993).

31.

See, e.g., Levias v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 352 F. Supp. 2d 751, 767–
68 (S.D. Tex. 2004).

32.

See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142
(2000) (“This Court has not squarely addressed whether the McDonnell
Douglas framework . . . applies to ADEA actions. Because the parties
do not dispute the issue, we shall assume, arguendo, that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is fully applicable here.”); Koteras v. Briggs Equip.,
Inc., 854 F. App’x 583, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework to ADEA claim).

33.

See, e.g., Sampson v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 88 F. Supp. 3d 422, 434 (E.D.
Pa. 2015).

34.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s
[protected group]” and, (3) “these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
[protected status].”35 In making this showing, the defendant may rely
on the fact that a peremptory challenge, by its nature, allows “those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.”36 After the defendant
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
prosecution to provide a neutral explanation for his use of a peremptory
challenge to strike the venire member.37 Thereafter, the trial judge has
the duty to determine whether the prosecutor’s proposed reasons are
the real reasons for the peremptory challenge, or whether they are
merely pretextual and the prosecutor actually exercised the peremptory
challenge on the basis of race, sex, or another protected characteristic.38
While the prosecutor’s explanation does not have to rise to the level of
an explanation for a challenge for cause,39 some courts have held that
it must be “clear and reasonably specific”40 and cannot simply state
that he struck the juror on account of her race, nor can it merely affirm
that he struck the juror in good faith.41
3.

Administrative Law

The Supreme Court forged into new territory in its decision in
Department of Commerce v. New York, 42 in which Chief Justice
Roberts held that the Department of Commerce’s stated reason for
including a citizenship question on the 2020 census, which was to
enforce the Voting Rights Act, was “contrived” (i.e., mere pretext)43 for

35.

Id. at 96.

36.

Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).

37.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.

38.

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 512–14 (2016).

39.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.

40.

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).

41.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98.

42.

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).

43.

Id. at 2575–76. In this section of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts does
not use the word “pretext” in concluding that the agency’s explanation
was “contrived,” although it appears in the syllabus, id. at 2557, and
throughout the Court’s summary of the District Court’s holding, id. at
2564, 2569, 2573, 2574. See also Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 339 F. Supp.
3d 144, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Therefore, for the purposes of this Comment,
I have assumed that the Chief Justice’s use of the word “contrived” holds
the same meaning as “pretextual.”
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its actual reason.44 The case was accordingly remanded to the agency
to come forward with a better explanation for its decision.45
While there was no established framework for the pretext inquiry
in this case, as in employment-discrimination or peremptory-challenge
cases, it is possible to dissect the Chief Justice’s reasoning and separate
it from his arbitrary-and-capricious inquiry under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”). In reviewing whether the decision to add the
citizenship question was arbitrary or capricious under the APA, the
Chief Justice concluded that it was not, reversing the District Court’s
finding. 46 The Chief Justice restated the arbitrary and capricious
inquiry as a “determin[ation] only [of] whether the Secretary examined
‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a satisfactory explanation’ for his
decision, ‘including a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.’”47 The Secretary analyzed the Census Bureau’s report
on various ways to improve the collection of citizenship data, which
included two main methods: (1) use administrative records alone, or (2)
reinstate a citizenship question on the census and supplement that data
with administrative records.48 The Census Bureau recommended the
first method, which would not have required a citizenship question on
the census.49 However, where the Bureau conceded that both methods
“entailed tradeoffs between accuracy and completeness,” the Secretary
properly “considered the relevant factors, weighed risks and benefits,
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision” to choose
the second method. 50 The Court held that this was a “reasonable
exercise of discretion” to which the District Court should have
deferred.51 Four other Justices agreed that the action was not arbitrary
and capricious.52
In a separate analysis, the Court affirmed that the stated reason
for the Department of Commerce’s decision, to enforce the Voting
Rights Act, was pretextual.53 The Court based its decision on the steps
the Secretary took leading up to the decision to pursue the citizenship

44.

Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574–75.

45.

Id. at 2576.

46.

Id. at 2571–72.

47.

Id. at 2569 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

48.

Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2569.

49.

Id. at 2570.

50.

Id. at 2569–70.

51.

Id. at 2570.

52.

See id. at 2576–78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part); id. at 2596, 2606 n.15
(Alito, J., concurring in part).

53.

Id. at 2575–76 (majority opinion).
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question.54 To begin with, when the Secretary first started taking action
to reinstate the citizenship question, there was no indication that the
purpose was to better enforce the VRA.55 The Secretary reached out to
multiple agencies (agencies that had nothing to do with the VRA) to
elicit a request for citizenship data without success.56 Finally, after the
Secretary contacted the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division directly, only then
did the DOJ send a letter with the exact request that the Secretary
elicited from them—to collect citizenship data by adding a question on
the census. 57 The DOJ declined to participate thereafter, which the
Court saw as “suggesting a lack of interest on DOJ’s part.” 58
Ultimately, it was clear to the Court that the Secretary “went to great
lengths to elicit the request from DOJ (or any other willing agency),”
indicating that “the VRA enforcement rational—the sole stated
reason—seems to have been contrived.”59
From this analysis, it is possible to glean a pretext-inquiry
framework that may be applied in the administrative-law context. First,
it is necessary to distinguish the arbitrary-and-capricious review from
the pretext inquiry that the Court conducted. The arbitrary-andcapricious review focuses only on whether the agency reviewed “the
relevant data” and made a rational choice based on that data.60 The
Justices came to different conclusions about whether the Secretary’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious, showing disagreement about how
deferential the arbitrary-and-capricious standard should be.61 However,
the pretext inquiry can be separated from arbitrary-and-capricious
54.

Id. at 2574–75.

55.

Id. at 2575.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id. Moreover, the Court added that the rationale was “incongruent” with
“the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process.” Id.

60.

Id. at 2569 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

61.

The Chief Justice concluded that the Secretary’s decision was not
arbitrary and capricious where “[h]e considered the relevant factors,
weighed risks and benefits, and articulated a satisfactory explanation for”
choosing the method that the Census Bureau did not recommend. Id. at
2570. Conversely, Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
would have held that the action was arbitrary and capricious because the
Secretary acted against the Census Bureau’s recommended course of
action and failed to give “adequate consideration to issues that should
have been central to his judgment, such as the high likelihood of an
undercount, the low likelihood that a question would yield more accurate
citizenship data, and the apparent lack of any need for more accurate
citizenship data to begin with.” Id. at 2584, 2595 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part).
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review under either standard. 62 The Chief Justice’s pretext finding
concerns the decision that predated the stage of “review[ing] the
relevant data” for the question of improving the collection of citizenship
data. Rather, he inquired into the initial decision to undertake that
question at all (before interpretation of data and the question of how
the action is carried out even comes into play) and concluded that it is
not explained by the “sole stated reason” the agency provided.63
In practice, it should be very rare that courts have the opportunity
apply this pretext framework. The record presented by parties in
Department of Commerce was unusually broad for administrative
review.64 Ordinarily, evidence as to how an agency decided to undertake
an action would not be on the record because courts are “usually”
barred from inquiring into “the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers.” 65 The District Court invoked the exception to this
rule, which allows “extra-record” discovery where there is a “strong
showing in support of a claim of bad faith or improper behavior.”66
Thus, as the Chief Justice acknowledges, the case presented “unusual
circumstances” where the Court had the entire paper trail to see the
agency’s decision-making process from its very inception.67

II. What Does a Finding of Pretext Look Like?
In the administrative-law context, pretext is evidenced by a
disconnect between the “decision made and the explanation given,” as
exemplified by the paper trail in Department of Commerce showing
that the Secretary elicited a request for the citizenship question from
the Department of Justice. 68 In the employment-discrimination and
peremptory-challenge contexts, evidence of pretext falls into several
similar categories.
A.

Employment Discrimination

In employment-discrimination cases, evidence of pretext can be
divided into several categories. To establish pretext, the plaintiff “must

62.

Justice Breyer acknowledged that the pretext inquiry differs from
arbitrary-and-capricious review. See id. at 2595 (“In my view, the Secretary’s
decision—whether pretextual or not—was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of his lawfully delegated discretion.”).

63.

Id. at 2570–71, 2575 (majority opinion).

64.

See id. at 2575.

65.

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971);
see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).

66.

New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 634 (S.D.N.Y.) (2019).

67.

Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2575–76.

68.

Id.
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identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in [the employer’s] proffered reasons that a reasonable person
could find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that [the
employer] did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”69
1.

Statistical Evidence

In an employment-discrimination case, a plaintiff may use
statistical evidence to support a finding of pretext.70 Similar treatment
of a number of employees with the same characteristic over a time
period, for example, can evidence a pattern of discrimination.71 In such
a case, “the statistics must show a significant disparity and eliminate
nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity.”72 Additionally, the
statistics must “be closely related to the issues in the case” 73 and
demonstrate a pattern among “comparable individuals.”74 Thus, mass
data sets that include individuals who were terminated for nondiscriminatory reasons (i.e., for cause) should be narrowed to include
only those individuals who suffered a similarly adverse employment
decision, and were of comparable skill and prior performance.75 Datasets
that are too small will not have probative value,76 and even probative
statistical evidence may be insufficient, without more, to support the
claim.77
2.

General Biases

Often, a plaintiff’s statistical evidence seeks to show a general bias
held by the defendant employer. For example, in Buchanan v. Tata

69.

Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)).

70.

See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007).

71.

See, e.g., id. at 1172–73.

72.

Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1991).

73.

Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009);
see also LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“[A] company’s overall employment statistics will . . . have little direct
bearing on the specific intentions of the employer when dismissing a
particular individual.”).

74.

Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1198 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting Rae v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th
Cir. 1994)).

75.

Id. at 1198.

76.

See, e.g., Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1991)
(stating that a data set of nine individuals is too small); Simpson v.
Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that a set
of seventeen individuals is too small without more context of the number
of employees at large).

77.

See Simpson, 823 F.3d at 944.
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Consultancy Services,78 the plaintiffs claimed a “pattern and practice of
favoring” South Asian people for employment by providing that the
employer’s “workforce was between 72.32% and 78.91% South
Asian . . . compared to 12.50% of the computer systems design and
related services industry as a whole.” 79 Additionally, documentary
evidence suggested that the employer favored South Asian expatriates
because they already had the requisite visa for the job.80
General biases have low probative value unless the plaintiff can
establish a nexus between the general bias and the adverse employment
decision. In Timmerman v. U.S. Bank,81 the plaintiff alleged that her
manager had “a general bias against older females.”82 The plaintiff put
forth evidence that the manager had previously replaced older female
employees with young men. 83 However, where the plaintiff failed to
show that there was some connection between the employer’s alleged
general bias and its firing of the plaintiff specifically, this evidence did
not demonstrate pretext.84
3.

Disparate Treatment

Evidence of disparate treatment of similarly situated employees
may support a finding of pretext. For example, in Boumehdi v. Plastag
Holdings,85 the plaintiff alleged that “she was the only employee in her
department who was not paid for skipping her lunch break, who had
her pay shorted consistently, and who did not receive a raise for her
2003 review.”86 The plaintiff identified a “similarly situated” co-worker
who had the same supervisor and worked on the same machine and did
not receive this treatment.87 The court found that these facts could
support a finding that the employer’s justifications for the disparate
treatment, a poor review score and stealing time, were pretext for sex
discrimination.88

78.

No. 15-CV-01696-YGR, 2017 WL 6611653 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017).

79.

Id. at *13–14.

80.

Id. at *14.

81.

483 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2007).

82.

Id. at 1118.

83.

Id. at 1113, 1118.

84.

See id. at 1121; see also id. at 1115 (“Ms. Timmerman’s circumstances
are not remotely comparable to what occurred when Ms. Johnson did not
rehire the female branch managers.”).

85.

489 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2007).

86.

Id. at 791.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 791–92 (holding that it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find
pretext).
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4.

Departing from Company Policy or Usual Procedure

Departing from company policy or usual procedure may support an
inference of pretext.89 In finding that an employer deviated from its
policies, courts have required that the deviation be unique to the
plaintiff and not one that affected all employees.90 In Ledbetter v. Alltel
Corporate Services, Inc., 91 the employer failed to follow its own
reclassification of pay-grade protocols contained in its company policy
guide, forcing the plaintiff to remain at a lower pay grade than the rest
of the management team following a reorganization.92 The court found
that the employer’s stated reasons for this treatment, “uncertainty
about the future of [plaintiff’s] department and the need to cut costs
following the reorganization,” were pretextual, especially where the
employer had “approved reclassifications for other employees” in
accordance with company policy.93
5.

Other Factors

Anecdotal evidence, such as age-related comments, may also
support a finding of pretext.94 Additionally, in the hiring context, a
plaintiff’s superior qualifications compared to the person who ultimately
got the job can be indicative of pretext.95 Lastly, where the employer
provides conflicting or inconsistent explanations for its conduct, the
court may infer pretext.96
Ultimately, a finding of pretext in the employment-discrimination
context means that the court is not persuaded by the employer’s
proffered reason for the adverse employment action based on the
evidence that the plaintiff puts forth. This evidence may include
statistics, general bias against plaintiff’s race, disparate treatment of
89.

See, e.g., Floyd v. State of Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 188 F.3d 932, 937
(8th Cir. 1999) (“An employer’s failure to follow its own policies may
support an inference of pretext.”).

90.

See id. (explaining that deviation from company hiring policy did not
support pretext finding where that deviation affected all candidates).

91.

437 F.3d 717 (8th Cir. 2006).

92.

Id. at 720–21.

93.

Id. at 722.

94.

See, e.g., Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

95.

Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that evidence of a plaintiff’s qualifications may
alone establish pretext where the plaintiff’s qualifications are “clearly
superior” to those of the applicant selected for the job (quoting Odima v.
Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1994))); Aka v. Wash.
Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (concluding
that pretext may be inferred where a “reasonable employer would have
found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job”).

96.

See Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2007).

234

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Pretext: Forms and Functions

the plaintiff compared to other similarly situated applicants or
employees, the employer’s failure to conform to usual company
procedures, anecdotes of the employer’s conduct, and a comparison
between the qualifications of the plaintiff and the person ultimately
selected for the position. The court may draw an inference of pretext
where the employer puts forth inconsistent reasons for the adverse
employment action. However, a finding that the proffered statement is
pretextual (i.e., not the employer’s real reason) may not be sufficient
for a plaintiff to meet her burden of proving that the real reason was
motivated by discrimination.97
B.

Batson Claims

On a Batson clam, a finding of pretext may be evidenced by similar
factors as employment-discrimination claims: statistical evidence of the
number of jurors of a certain race struck;98 disparate questioning of
Black and white prospective jurors in the case;99 and a comparison of
the characteristics of jurors struck versus those not struck. 100
Additionally, courts examine the extent to which the State’s actual voir
dire examination reflects the race-neutral characteristics with which it
is allegedly concerned. 101 A history of the prosecution’s use of
peremptory strikes in past cases may also be relevant in proving that
the prosecution has engaged in a “pattern” of discriminatory strikes,
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.102 The ultimate inquiry is
whether the prosecution was “motivated in substantial part by

97.

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523–24 (1993).

98.

See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019).

99.

Id.

100. See id.; Taylor v. Jordan, 10 F.4th 625, 663 (6th Cir. 2021) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“Imagine that a prosecutor approaches voir dire guided by
two primary goals, in order of importance: (1) to include as many jurors
as possible who strongly favor the death penalty; and (2) to exclude as
many [B]lack jurors as possible. In keeping with these goals, the
prosecutor opposes the defendant’s attempts to exclude [B]lack jurors
expressing particularly favorable views of the death penalty while
simultaneously seeking to exclude all other [B]lack jurors. The
prosecutor’s conduct would unquestionably be a Batson violation because
jurors would be excluded solely on account of their race.”).
101. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2249 (“A ‘State’s failure to engage in any
meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is
concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham
and a pretext for discrimination.’” (quoting Miller-El II v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 246 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
102. See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2233; Miller-El I v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347
(2003); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986).
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discriminatory intent.”103 A finding of pretext will hinge on how convincing the judge finds the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations,104
so most defendants put forth evidence of several of these factors to
highlight the underlying discrimination.105
For example, in Flowers v. Mississippi,106 the Supreme Court found
a Batson violation where the defense put forth evidence that the
prosecution had struck forty-one out of forty-two “[B]lack prospective
jurors that it could have struck.”107 Additionally, the defense showed
that the prosecutor engaged in disparate questioning of Black and white
prospective jurors, directing an average of twenty-nine questions to
each Black prospective juror and one question to each white prospective
juror, which the Court took as an effort to “try to find some pretextual
reason—any reason—that the prosecutor can later articulate to justify
what is in reality a racially motivated strike.” 108 Furthermore, the
defense demonstrated that the prosecution had struck a Black juror for
knowing individuals involved in the case, despite her avid support of
the death penalty, but did not strike white jurors who also knew people
involved in the case.109 Therefore, the prosecution’s proffered reason for
the peremptory strikes at issue—that they had connections with people
in the case—did not comport with its action of striking Black jurors

103. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016) (quoting Snyder v.
Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 (2008)).
104. Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The evaluation of a prosecutor’s
motives for striking a juror is at bottom a credibility judgment, which lies
‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’” (quoting Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991))).
105. See, e.g., Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 253. (“The case for discrimination goes
beyond these comparisons [of jurors struck versus those not struck] to
include broader patterns of practice during the jury selection. The
prosecution’s shuffling of the venire panel, its enquiry into views on the
death penalty, its questioning about minimum acceptable sentences: all
indicate decisions probably based on race. Finally, the appearance of
discrimination is confirmed by widely known evidence of the general policy
of the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office to exclude [B]lack venire
members from juries at the time Miller–El’s jury was selected”); Flowers,
139 S. Ct. at 2244 (“Four categories of evidence loom large in assessing
the Batson issue in Flowers’ case: (1) the history from Flowers’ six trials,
(2) the prosecutor’s striking of five of six [B]lack prospective jurors at the
sixth trial, (3) the prosecutor’s dramatically disparate questioning of
[B]lack and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial, and (4) the
prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking one [B]lack juror (Carolyn
Wright) while allowing other similarly situated white jurors to serve on
the jury at the sixth trial.”).
106. 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
107. Id. at 2235.
108. Id. at 2248.
109. Id. at 2249.
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with those connections, but allowing white jurors to serve.110 Therefore,
the Court determined that the Mississippi Supreme Court had clearly
erred in not finding a Batson violation on these facts.111
Like in the employment-discrimination context, a pretext finding
in a Batson claim reflects the court’s disbelief that the prosecution’s
stated reason for the strike is the real reason. The prosecution’s raceneutral reason may still be applicable or true. In fact, that reason could
very well be those “of concern to a great many attorneys[,]” such as a
prospective juror’s familiarity with the case. 112 But where the raceneutral explanation is not the prosecution’s real reason to dismiss the
prospective juror—as shown by disparate questioning, a comparison
between the juror struck and those not struck, and statistical or other
evidence—the court may infer that its real reason is discriminatory.113

III. Differences in How Courts Treat Pretext – Are
Those Differences Merited?
There are two important differences in how pretext is examined in
the peremptory, employment-discrimination, and administrative-law
contexts. First, the purpose of the inquiries differs. Second, the extent
to which pretext is determinative of a case differs.114 Considering these
differences in the established areas of employment discrimination and
peremptory challenges informs how pretext should be treated in the
administrative-law context after the Department of Commerce decision.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 2251.
112. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
113. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008) (“The prosecution’s
proffer of this pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory intent.”).
114. A third difference in how pretext is examined across these areas is in
mixed-motive cases. In the employment-discrimination context, a finding
that one of the reasons for the adverse employment action was pretextual
and race-based, but one was neutral, is still grounds for finding a violation
of Title VII. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100–01 (2003).
But in the peremptory-challenge context, as long as the prosecution can
prove that they would have struck the juror (for race-neutral reasons)
even in the absence of race-based considerations, some courts would find
that the discrimination claim fails. See 50A C.J.S. Juries § 466. This issue
is outside the scope of this Comment, but it poses important
considerations for how pretext is treated across other areas of law. See
generally Lisa M. Cox, Note, The “Tainted Decision-Making Approach”:
A Solution for the Mixed Messages Batson Gets from Employment
Discrimination, 56 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 769 (2006).

237

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Pretext: Forms and Functions
A.

Purpose

The purpose of inquiring into pretext differs among these three
areas of law, which is indicative of how courts should treat the inquires.
Employment discrimination and peremptory challenges may be
grouped into the same category—the inquiry into pretext in both areas
is for the purpose of ferreting out discriminatory motive for the action
at issue. Employment-discrimination claims are governed by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, which seeks to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin; 115 or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which seeks to prohibit “arbitrary
age discrimination in employment;” 116 or the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which seeks “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”117 Similarly, a Batson claim was recognized “to eradicate racial discrimination [in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause] in the procedures used to select the venire from
which individual jurors are drawn,”118 and was later extended to cover
claims of discrimination based on gender. 119 In both instances, the
purpose of the claims is to address a right of the individual not to be
discriminated against, which is clearly made illegal in these contexts by
federal law120 and the Constitution.121
Pretext inquiries in administrative law differ from the employment
and peremptory contexts in that the court’s apparent purpose is to
ferret out the real reason for the agency’s action, not because the real
reason is necessarily discriminatory,122 but merely because the stated
reason has been fabricated; it is not the genuine reason for the action.123
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(b) (2020); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII makes plain
the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
minority citizens.”). The Court has held that the broad language of Title
VII also protects employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, even though this may not have been what Congress intended
to do when enacting the statute in 1964. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2020).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2020).
118. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
119. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1996).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(b) (2020).
121. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. V.
122. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (affirming
the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim).
123. Id.
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The purpose that the Chief Justice put forth for requiring a genuine
explanation for an administrative decision is so that it “can be
scrutinized by courts and the interested public.” 124 Thus, whereas
pretext inquiries in the former situations seek to unveil illegal action,
in the latter situation, the pretext inquiry is for the purpose of political
accountability.125
This is somewhat of a shift from the traditional purpose of judicial
review of administrative decisions.126 Under the APA, the standard for
reviewing agency actions is usually construed as one similar to “rational
basis” review.127 Therefore, as long as the agency has provided some
evidence of “reasoned decisionmaking,” 128 the court affords a great
amount of deference to the agency’s process, especially in regards to
“product[s] of agency expertise”129 and “the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers.”130
B.

Pretext as Determinative of a Case

A prominent difference regarding pretext across these three areas
of law is how determinative a finding of pretext is for a case. In the
peremptory-challenge context, a finding of pretext usually results in the
court concluding that the strike was unlawful. 131 Conversely, in the
employment-discrimination context, a finding of pretext does not

124. Id.
125. However, where an agency is explicitly allowed to have “both stated and
unstated reasons for a decision,” it is unclear how much political
accountability is really going to come from a pretext inquiry into a stated
reason. Id. at 2559. This may only be half the picture.
126. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“The Court’s holding reflects an
unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary
agency decisions.”).
127. See Lee Modjeska, Administrative Law Practice and Procedure
§ 6:14, at 218–19 (1982) (“Review of agency action . . . entails a highly
deferential standard of review which presumes the validity of agency
action and requires affirmance if the action is supported by a rational
basis.”); see also Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
419 U.S. 281, 290 (1974).
128. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
129. Id. at 43.
130. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
131. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2241 (2019); Tracy M.Y. Choy,
Note, Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual Under Batson v. Kentucky:
An Examination of the Role of the Trial Judge in Jury Selection, 48
Hastings L.J. 577, 580 (1997); David A. Stuphen, Note, True Lies: The
Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 488, 489–90 (1995).
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always mean a plaintiff will prevail. 132 In the administrative-law
context, a finding that an agency’s explanation for an action was
pretextual usually means that the plaintiff will prevail on its motion for
extra-record discovery; 133 alternatively, a pretext finding after the
record has already been expanded may result in the court setting aside
the agency’s action.134
In each of these areas, the proponent of the action maintains the
burden of persuasion,135 but a finding of pretext is not always sufficient
to meet that burden. However, given that the pretext inquiries in
employment-discrimination and Batson claims arise in contextually
different areas, this varying treatment of pretext makes sense and may
illuminate how evidence of pretext should be treated in administrative
law.
1.

Title VII and Batson Claims – Pretext vs. “Pretext-Plus”

In St. Mary Honor Center v. Hicks,136 the Court determined that
mere evidence of pretext is insufficient, by itself, to compel judgment
for the plaintiff as matter of law in an employment-discrimination
case.137 Rather, evidence of pretext creates a permissive inference that
allows, but does not require, the fact finder to conclude that the

132. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (“[A] reason
cannot be proved to be a ‘pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both
that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”).
133. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019) (explaining
that an order granting extra-record discovery was “premature” but
“ultimately justified”); Cook Cty. v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 796 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (following Department of Commerce and granting order for
extra-record discovery on pretext grounds); cf. Dall. Safari Club v.
Bernhardt, 518 F. Supp. 3d 535, 544 (D.D.C. 2021) (distinguishing
Department of Commerce and denying motion for extra-record discovery
where “each of the agency’s stated reasons finds at least some support in
the record” and “none of the [four] reasons contained in the DOI Memo
are so lacking in credibility or so contradicted by other evidence as to
suspect them to be contrived” (emphasis added)).
134. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574–76.
135. See Amdt14.S1.4.1.4.2 Peremptory Challenges, Const. Annotated,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt14_S1_4_1_4_2/
[https://perma.cc/HA2F-BZRA] (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (stating that
the opponent of a peremptory strike bears the burden of persuasion); St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507–08 (1993) (explaining that a plaintiff
bears the burden of persuasion at all times in an employmentdiscrimination claim); Butte Cty. v. Chaudhuri, 197 F. Supp. 3d 82, 92
(D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 887 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (explaining that a
plaintiff challenging an administrative action as arbitrary and capricious
under Section 706(2)(A) of the APA bears the burden of persuasion).
136. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
137. Id. at 515–18.
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employer discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of Title VII.138
Before this case, courts were divided on whether evidence of pretext
compelled a judgment for the plaintiff. Some courts held that a finding
of only pretext was sufficient, 139 while others required additional
evidence showing discriminatory motive, referred to as the “pretextplus” approach.140 Acknowledging that the former approach may subject employers to Title VII liability unjustifiably, the Court in St. Mary
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks141 adopted the latter approach, explaining that
Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot
prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action,
but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse
employment action by reason of (in the context of the present
case) race. That the employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive,
or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that
the plaintiff’s proffered reason of race is correct.142

Therefore, in order to prevail on an employment-discrimination
claim, a plaintiff may have to put forth additional evidence of the
employer’s discriminatory motive.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.
1987) (“If the plaintiff convinces the trier of fact that it is more likely
than not that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then the
employer’s decision remains unexplained and the inferences from the
evidence produced by the plaintiff may be sufficient to prove the ultimate
fact of discriminatory intent . . . .”), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 1052
(1987); Dister v. Cont’l Grp., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[A]
plaintiff may prevail upon a showing that the employer’s given legitimate
reason is unworthy of credence, that is, that the reason supplied was not
the true reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”); MacDissi v.
Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) (“As a matter of
both common sense and federal law, an employer’s submission of a
discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself
evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful
discrimination actually occurred.”).
140. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sec’y of Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[I]t
was plaintiff’s burden not only to show that the defendants’ proffered
reasons for hiring someone else were apocryphal, but that those reasons
were pretexts aimed at masking sex or race discrimination.”); Hawkins
v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 981 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Of course, merely
establishing pretext, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of
racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show he suffered intentional
discrimination because of his race.” (citation omitted) (citing Nix v.
WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’n, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984)));
see also Stuphen, supra note 131, at 503 (referring to the “pretext-plus
approach”).
141. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
142. Id. at 523–24.
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Conversely, in a Batson claim, if the court finds that the
prosecutor’s race-neutral reason for striking the juror was pretextual,
that is sufficient to allow the defendant to prevail on the Batson claim
as a matter of law.143 In other words, evidence that a prosecutor lied
about his real reason for striking the juror “is the legal equivalent to
proof of intentional discrimination.”144 The defendant need not actually
present proof of that discrimination beyond a prima facie showing.
Even though Batson claims have been modeled after Title VII
claims since their inception, 145 it makes sense that the Batson
framework does not conform to the standard of proof set out in Hicks
claims for several reasons. First, on Batson claims, factfinders are not
required to consider an employment relationship, which could give rise
to many other nondiscriminatory factors that go into employment
decisions, such as political, personal, or behavioral factors. 146 No
relationship forms between a prosecutor and potential juror during voir
dire, eliminating the potential that the strike was based on such
external factors.
Relatedly, the scope of evidence available in a Batson claim is
narrower than a Title VII claim.147 All the court is able to consider is
the defendant’s prima facie showing—usually limited to characteristics
of the potential jurors and statements from the prosecutor during voir
dire—and the prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking the juror. 148
Thus, where the available evidence is limited, the defendant may only
be able to prove pretext.149 Requiring proof of intentional discrimination
would impose a much higher burden on the criminal defendant.
Moreover, when making a prima facie showing of a Batson violation,
the defendant is allowed to rely on the fact that a peremptory challenge
is structured so as to allow “those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate.”150
143. See, e.g., Tursio v. United States, 634 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C. 1993); Oliver
v. State, 826 S.W.2d 787, 789–90 (Tex. App. 1992); see also Stuphen, supra
note 131, at 489–90.
144. Stuphen, supra note 131, at 502; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
1203, 1212 (2008) (“The prosecution’s proffer of this pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.”).
145. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) (establishing a
standard for prima facie showing of a Batson violation) (first citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); then citing Tex.
Dept. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 24 (1981); and then citing U.S.
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983))).
146. Stuphen, supra note 131, at 507.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 510.
150. Id. at 494.
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Lastly, in a Title VII claim, an employer may be held liable for the
actions of another—its employee who took the adverse action against
the plaintiff—perhaps meriting a greater showing of intentional discrimination in order to impose liability.151 Conversely, in a Batson claim,
the prosecutor is not being held responsible for the actions of someone
else, nor does he have to try to explain the actions of someone else; the
court is examining the prosecutor’s own explanation and statements
made during voir dire.152 Thus, it makes sense that a showing of pretext,
by itself, is sufficient to prevail on a Batson claim but not on a Title
VII claim.
2.

Administrative Claims – Which Standard of Proof?

The Court’s recent opinion in Department of Commerce has already
precipitated claims of pretext alongside claims made under provisions
of the APA.153 What standard of proof should be applied to the pretext
claims? Considering the factors scholars have used to distinguish the
standards of proof in Title VII and Batson claims and how the
administrative-law context differs from both of these areas, it is clear
that a finding of pretext should be sufficient to prevail on a motion for
extra-record discovery. But determining what standard of proof should
be required to set aside an agency’s decision as the Court did in
Department of Commerce presents a more difficult question.
a.

Motion for Extra-Record Discovery

On a motion to compel completion of the record or extra-record
discovery, the scope of evidence available to the plaintiffs is usually
quite narrow because “a court is ordinarily limited to evaluating the
agency’s contemporaneous explanation in light of the existing

151. Id. at 507.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Nat’l Urb. League v. Ross, 489 F. Supp. 3d 939, 980 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (granting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiffs alleged
that the administrative action was both pretextual and arbitrary and
capricious under the APA); Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779,
795–96 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (relying on Department of Commerce’s pretext
analysis to grant motion for extra-record discovery where “DHS’s stated
reason for promulgating the Final Rule [redefining ‘public charge’ as used
in determining an immigrant’s admissibility to the United States]—
protecting the fisc—obscures what [plaintiff] alleges is the real reason—
disproportionately suppressing nonwhite immigration.”); Dall. Safari Club
v. Bernhardt, 518 F. Supp. 3d 535, 544 (D.D.C. 2021) (distinguishing
Department of Commerce’s pretext finding and denying a motion for
extra-record discovery where none of the agency’s stated reasons for
failing to process plaintiffs’ permit applications were “contrived”).
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administrative record.”154 Therefore, like with Batson claims, it makes
sense that a plaintiff need only show evidence of pretext in order to
prevail on the motion. Requiring any greater showing would create an
extremely difficult hurdle for plaintiffs, given the limited administrative
record that they would have available from which to glean some other
motive underlying the pretextual explanation.155
Because motions for extra-record discovery are usually evaluated
before a limited administrative record,156 the standard in Department of
Commerce actually sets the bar quite high for a plaintiff to prevail.
Recall that the Chief Justice made the pretext finding in Department
of Commerce on an already-expanded record, noting that extra-record
discovery was ordered prematurely.157 However, courts are applying the
Department of Commerce pretext framework (“the sole stated
reason . . . seems to have been contrived”158) on motions for extrarecord discovery, when the existing record in front of the court is quite
limited.159 But the pretext finding in Department of Commerce was
based on an already-expanded record, so it does not make sense to apply
that framework to a not-yet-expanded record in order to expand it.
Nevertheless, courts are using the decision in this way, probably
because the Chief Justice’s section analyzing pretext within the
expanded recorded was intertwined with the “strong showing of bad
faith” standard used to expand that record in the first place.160
Department of Commerce opened the possibility that a court could
affirm an order granting extra-record discovery post facto, in light of
154. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (citing Vt.
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
549 (1978)).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 157–62.
156. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2574.
157. The Court in the Department of Commerce case said,
We agree with the Government that the District Court should
not have ordered extra-record discovery when it did. At that time,
the most that was warranted was the order to complete the
administrative record. But the new material that the parties
stipulated should have been part of the administrative record—
which showed, among other things, that the VRA played an
insignificant role in the decisionmaking process—largely justified
such extra-record discovery as occurred . . . . We accordingly
review the District Court’s ruling on pretext in light of all the
evidence in the record before the court, including the extra-record
discovery.
Id.
158. Id. at 2575.
159. See, e.g., Cook Cnty. v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 795–96 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
160. 139 S. Ct. at 2573–74 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
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what the extra discovery revealed.161 Because the pretext finding was
made in this unique procedural posture, its application to other cases
at a different procedural stage is questionable. Additionally, if it is
taken as an interpretation of the “strong showing of bad faith”
standard, it creates a high bar for a party to prevail on a motion for
extra-record discovery where they must show, from a limited record,
that the “sole stated reason” for the agency’s action was “contrived.”162
Therefore, requiring only a showing of pretext to prevail on a motion
for extra-record discovery (rather than pretext-plus) makes sense given
the usually limited record before the court; the necessary showing of
“pretext” should not rise to Department of Commerce’s requirement
that the sole-stated reason was contrived, because that showing was
derived from a large, detailed record that was already expanded.
b.

Remand

Once the record has been expanded, there should be sufficient
evidence from which plaintiffs could detect some ulterior motive, if one
exists, in addition to the pretext concealing that motive, in accordance
with the pretext-plus approach. Moreover, traditional deference to
agencies supports a higher burden on the challengers of an agency
action to persuade a court to set the action aside. 163 However, in
practice, a pretext-plus approach may be difficult to apply.
The difficulty is rooted in the problematic question of what ulterior
motive plaintiffs should allege—what is the “plus”? Put differently,
what kind of ulterior motive is prohibited? Unlike Title VII and Batson
claims, which seek to detect discrimination,164 the pretext inquiry in an
administrative-law context is for the purpose of political accountability,
not necessarily to ferret out an illegal motive. 165 In Department of
Commerce, the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful Equal Protection claim alleged
that the Secretary’s decision to add the citizenship question was
“motivated by discriminatory animus,”166 but the Court did not allude
to this being the motivation concealed by the “contrived” VRA
enforcement explanation.167 Rather, the fact that the VRA enforcement
explanation was contrived, by itself, merited remand. 168 This makes
sense, given that the statute supposedly governing the pretext claim,
161. 139 S. Ct. at 2556.
162. See, e.g., Dall. Safari Club v. Bernhardt, 518 F. Supp. 3d 535, 541–43.
(D.D.C. 2021).
163. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 137–52
165. See supra text accompanying notes 122–25.
166. 139 S. Ct. at 2564–65.
167. See id. at 2574–76.
168. Id.
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the APA, does not explicitly prohibit agency actions motivated by
discriminatory intent as Title VII does in employment decisions and as
Batson does in peremptory strikes. Rather, it only prohibits agency
actions which are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.”169
Therefore, given that a pretext-plus approach is not applicable in
an administrative-law context, a simple finding of pretext should be
sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden on a motion for extra-record
discovery and, thereafter, to set aside the agency’s decision. This
approach would be in line with the Chief Justice’s stated purpose of the
inquiry: political accountability. 170 This standard would incentivize
agencies to give truthful explanations for their decisions and refrain
from concealing political motives, allowing the public to hold actors
responsible for their decisions. Although agencies are allowed to rely on
“unstated considerations of politics, the legislative process, public
relations, interest group relations, foreign relations, and national
security concerns (among other [factors]),”171 their stated considerations
should, at the very least, be genuine. Otherwise political accountability
is impossible and, from the perspective of the judiciary, any review
would be meaningless.172

Conclusion
Pretext takes on various forms and functions in the employmentdiscrimination, Batson, and administrative-law contexts. The purpose
of inquiring into pretext in each of these fields differs—employmentdiscrimination claims and Batson claims are concerned with illegal
discrimination, whereas administrative-law pretext claims are a tool for
political accountability. These purposes should inform the extent to
which a finding of pretext is determinative of a case. The size of the
record available to a claimant when alleging pretext should inform
whether the claimant is required to prove mere pretext, as in Batson
claims, or pretext-plus, as in the case of employment-discrimination
claims.
These factors also illuminate how pretext may be treated in
administrative law after the Department of Commerce decision. First,
mere pretext should be sufficient to prevail on a motion for extra-record
discovery, but courts should consider that the Department of
Commerce pretext finding was made on an already-expanded record.
Accordingly, courts should be cautious in comparing the showing in
Department of Commerce, where the agency’s “sole stated reason” was
169. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
170. 139 S. Ct. at 2573.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See id.
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“contrived,”173 to other cases where only a limited record is available at
the stage of a motion for extra-record discovery. Second, because the
APA does not prohibit an underlying animus, like Title VII and Batson
do in regards to discrimination, a mere finding of pretext (rather than
pretext-plus) should suffice to merit remand to the agency, as
exemplified by Department of Commerce. Ultimately, pretext has
proven to be a powerful evidentiary tool to advance the purpose of Title
VII and Batson claims, and its treatment in these contexts illustrates
how pretext can be used in administrative law to further political
accountability.
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